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ABSTRACT 
As we increasingly delegate important decisions to 
intelligent systems, it is essential that users understand how 
algorithmic decisions are made. Prior work has often taken 
a technocentric approach to transparency. In contrast, we 
explore empirical user-centric methods to better understand 
user reactions to transparent systems. We assess user 
reactions to global and incremental feedback in two studies. 
In Study 1, users anticipated that the more transparent 
incremental system would perform better, but retracted this 
evaluation after experience with the system. Qualitative 
data suggest this may arise because incremental feedback is 
distracting and undermines simple heuristics users form 
about system operation. Study 2 explored these effects in 
depth, suggesting that users may benefit from initially 
simplified feedback that hides potential system errors and 
assists users in building working heuristics about system 
operation. We use these findings to motivate new 
progressive disclosure principles for transparency in 
intelligent systems.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Machine learning algorithms underlie the many intelligent 
systems we routinely use. These systems provide 
information ranging from routes to work to 
recommendations about criminal parole [3,8]. As humans 
with limited time and attention, we increasingly defer 
responsibility to these systems with little reflection or 
oversight. Nevertheless, intelligent systems face mounting 
criticisms about how they make decisions; criticisms that 
are exacerbated by recent machine learning advances like 
deep learning that are difficult to explain in human-
comprehensible terms. Major public concerns have arisen 
following demonstrations of bias in algorithmic systems 
with regards to gender, race, and other characteristics 
[9,73,76]. These issues have led to calls for transparency as 
a solution to the unintelligible algorithms that impair the 
adoption of intelligent systems [31,61,80]. 
Algorithmic transparency is needed for many reasons. 
Greater transparency potentially increases end user control 
and improves acceptance of complex algorithmic systems 
[41]. It can also promote user learning and insight from 
complex data, as humans increasingly work with complex 
inferential systems for analytic purposes [41,69]. 
Transparency can also enable oversight by system 
designers. Without such transparency it may be unclear 
whether an algorithm is optimizing the intended behavior 
[32,49], or whether an algorithm accidentally promotes 
negative, unintended consequences (e.g. filter bubbles in 
social media; [10,62]). Given these current issues, it is 
increasingly possible that transparency, i.e. “a right to 
explanation”, may become a legal requirement in some 
contexts [28]. These issues have led researchers to argue 
that machine learning must be ‘interpretable by design’ [1] 
and that transparency is essential for the adoption of 
intelligent systems, e.g. for medical diagnoses [31,80]. 
While such calls for transparency are well-motivated, it 
remains unclear exactly how to enact them in practice. 
Extensive research about operationalizing transparency has 
emerged in the machine learning community but no clear 
consensus has resulted [1,21,79]. Deciding exactly how to 
implement transparency is difficult—there are numerous 
implementation trade-offs involving accuracy and fidelity. 
Making a complex algorithm understandable to end users 
might require simplification, which often comes at the cost 
of reduced accuracy of explanation [44,69]. For example, 
methods have been proposed to explain neural network 
algorithms in terms of more traditional machine learning 
approaches, but these explanations necessarily present 
approximations of the actual algorithms deployed [51]. 
These studies often approach transparency from a technical 
perspective: “what is possible from an algorithmic 
standpoint?” rather than “what does the user need?” 
Paste the appropriate copyright/license statement here. ACM now supports 
three different publication options: 
• ACM copyright: ACM holds the copyright on the work. This is the 
historical approach. 
• License: The author(s) retain copyright, but ACM receives an 
exclusive publication license. 
• Open Access: The author(s) wish to pay for the work to be open 
access. The additional fee must be paid to ACM. 
This text field is large enough to hold the appropriate release statement 
assuming it is single-spaced in Times New Roman 8-point font. Please do 
not change or modify the size of this text box. 
Each submission will be assigned a DOI string to be included here. 
However, some recent empirical studies attempt to examine 
the effects of transparency on users. But these studies reveal 
puzzling and sometimes contradictory effects. In some 
settings there are expected benefits:  transparency improves 
algorithmic perceptions because users better understand 
system behavior [40,41,47]. But in other circumstances, 
transparency has other quite paradoxical effects. 
Transparency may erode confidence in a system, with users 
trusting it less because transparency led them to question 
the system even when it was correct [47]. Providing system 
explanations may also undermine user perceptions when 
users lack the attentional capacity to process complex 
explanations, for example while they are executing a 
demanding task [12,81]. Overall, these results indicate 
mixed evidence for the benefits of transparent systems. 
The above research suggests that we have yet to identify the 
appropriate interaction paradigms to present transparency. 
Machine learning research communities are forging ahead 
with foundational research on how to generate transparent 
systems [79] but studies often stop short of actually testing 
these systems with users [46,48]. Evaluation is critical 
because, as we have seen, user reactions to transparency 
show quite contradictory results [12,41,47]. Some research 
suggests that the way we present transparency may account 
for these contradictory results [26,40]. Our research seeks 
to bridge this gap between generating explanations and 
user-centric presentation. In two studies, we explore users’ 
direct reactions to a transparent personal informatics system 
that interprets their emotions. We examine user preferences 
for different forms of transparency by comparing two 
versions of a working system: one that provides detailed 
incremental feedback about the underlying algorithm and 
another system version that provides holistic global 
feedback. We also examine the role of cognitive load in 
explaining these preferences, and explore problems with 
current presentations of transparency. We address the 
following research questions: 
• RQ1: Do users prefer to use more transparent 
systems? Do they prefer systems providing 
detailed incremental feedback or those that offer 
global transparency? (Study 1) 
• RQ2: Does cognitive load and distraction play a 
role in preferences for transparency? (Study 1) 
• RQ3: What problems must be mitigated to support 
effective transparency? (Studies 1 and 2) 
CONTRIBUTION: Much recent work on transparency has 
focused on technical explorations of self-explanatory 
systems. In contrast, here we take an empirical user-centric 
approach to better understand how to design transparent 
systems. Two studies provide novel data concerning user 
reactions to systems offering incremental vs global 
transparency information. In Study 1 users anticipated that 
an incremental system would perform better, but retracted 
this evaluation after experience with the system. Qualitative 
data suggest this may be because incremental feedback can 
be distracting and potentially undermines simple heuristics 
users form of system operation. Study 2 explored these 
effects in more detail suggesting that users may benefit 
from simplified feedback that hides potential system errors 
and assists users in building working heuristics about 
system operation. We use these data to motivate new 
progressive disclosure principles for presenting 
transparency in intelligent systems. 
RELATED WORK 
Folk Theories of Algorithms 
A wealth of prior work has explored issues surrounding 
algorithm transparency in the commercial deployments of 
systems for social media and news curation. Social media 
feeds are often curated by algorithms that may be invisible 
to users (e.g., Facebook. Twitter, LinkedIn). At one point, 
most users were unaware that Facebook newsfeeds were not 
simply all the posts that their friends made [24]. These 
users reacted in surprise and sometimes anger when they 
were shown the posts that were missing from their 
newsfeed. Later research shows that many users of 
Facebook develop ‘folk theories’ of their social feed [22], 
which are imprecise heuristics about how the system works, 
even going so far as to make concrete plans based upon 
their folk theories. This work also showed that making the 
design more transparent or seamful, allowed users to 
generate multiple folk theories and more readily compare 
and contrast between them [22]. 
Other work has illustrated issues regarding incorrect folk 
theories in the domain of intelligent personal informatics 
systems, showing specific challenges in how users 
understand these systems. Users are prone to blindly 
believing outputs from algorithmic systems, a phenomena 
referred to as algorithmic omniscience [23,36,74] and 
automation bias [17,56]. For example, KnowMe [78] is a 
program that infers personality traits from a user’s posts on 
social media based on Big Five personality theory. 
KnowMe users were quick to defer to algorithmic judgment 
about their own personalities, stating that the algorithm is 
likely to have greater credibility than their own personal 
statements (e.g., “...At the end of the day, that’s who the 
system says I am...”). Similar results were shown in [36], 
showing that participants expected intelligent personal 
informatics systems to serve as ground truth for their 
experiences and even attributed superhuman qualities to 
these devices, e.g., “...[it] could tell me about an emotion I 
don‘t know that I am feeling...”. Other experiments indicate 
the risk of such trust, showing that users may believe even 
entirely random system outputs as moderately accurate 
[74]. Similarly, giving users placebo controls over an 
algorithmic interface shows corroborating results [77]; 
users with placebo controls felt more satisfied with their 
newsfeed. Without a standard of transparency in intelligent 
systems, it may be easy to deceive end-users into believing 
they are using a real system; this is a dangerous proposition 
when apps can be so easily distributed. 
Transparency 
There is a long history of studying transparency and 
intelligibility in automated systems [6]. However, the 
results have mixed and often indicate contradictory effects 
on user perceptions. Many experiments have indicated that 
transparency improves user perceptions of the system 
[20,46]. Others have shown that interventions that simply 
show prediction confidence improve users system 
perceptions [4]. In extreme cases, animations that simulate 
transparency can cause users to be overconfident about 
systems even when they err [26].  
Other studies show less positive effects for user perceptions 
of a system. Participants who completed an experiment 
using a hypothetical transparent system were led to question 
the system an increased amount, resulting in worse 
agreement with the system [47]. However, the effect may 
be opposite for high certainty systems—transparency may 
only result in higher user agreement. Muir and Moray 
conclude that any hint of error in an automated system will 
decrease trust [57]. More recent work indicates other 
effects; explanations of how a system is working may lead 
to increased trust [40] but further explanations may be 
harmful to user perceptions. However, these effects are 
dependent upon the amount of expectation violation that a 
user experiences. User expectation violation follows an 
event where a system behaves in a way that a user did not 
expect [40,74,77]. Ideally transparency should build user 
confidence in a system, whether or not the user is 
experiencing expectation violation. However, it seems the 
research communities have not found the correct interaction 
paradigms to achieve this. 
Recently, the machine learning community has begun 
grappling with issues of transparency and explainability. 
This seems due to the rise of more inscrutable methods like 
deep learning as well as legal requirements arising from the 
European Union’s GDPR. Some machine learning models 
are “inherently understandable” such as linear models and 
Generalized Additive Models [50,79]. These 
understandable models can be “explained” to users simply 
through the linear contributions of their features. Other 
algorithms such as deep neural nets and random forests are 
inscrutable, and it is nontrivial to explain how input features 
match to output predictions [79]. Many attempts have been 
made to make these inscrutable algorithms understandable. 
These rely on approximating the inscrutable algorithm 
through a simple local or linear model than can be 
explained to the end user [51,69].  However, even with 
these methods that result in “inherently understandable” 
models, there is no clear consensus how to convey these 
models to users in an understandable way. Many such 
attempts at transparency are not tested with users or 
simulate user studies [5,55,58]. Without real user feedback, 
we cannot hope to operationalize transparency in ways that 
positively impact users. 
Explanation and Persuasion Theory 
People interact with computers and intelligent systems in 
ways that mirror how they interact with other people 
[60,68]. Given that transparency is essentially an 
explanation of why a model made a given prediction, we 
can turn to fields such as psychology and sociology for 
guidance about operationalizing explanations. These fields 
have a long history of studying explanation. Hilton shows 
that causal explanation takes the form of conversation and 
thus is governed by the common-sense rules of 
conversation [34] such as Grice’s maxims [29]. In addition, 
when explanation is needed and a communication 
breakdown occurs this is remedied by a phenomena known 
as conversational repair. Conversational repair is 
interactional, participants in the conversation work together 
to achieve mutual understanding; this often happens in a 
turn-by-turn structure with repeated questions and 
clarifications [71]. These theories would indicate that we 
should operationalize transparency in ways that fit human 
communication and repair strategies. 
Additionally, we see parallels between how people interact 
with intelligent systems and persuasion theory. The 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) is a dual process 
model of persuasion [64]. The ELM posits that two parallel 
processes are engaged when a person evaluates an 
argument, similar to Kahneman’s conception of System 1 
and 2 thinking [38]. The central processing route involves 
careful consideration of the argument and complex 
integration into a person’s beliefs. The central route is often 
engaged in high stakes decisions. The peripheral route in 
contrast focuses on heuristic cues such as the attractiveness 
of the speaker, the person’s current affect, the number and 
length of the arguments, and other cues not directly related 
to the content of the argument. Prior work on intelligent 
systems seems to align with this dual process model [40], 
people understand systems through peripheral routes if their 
expectations are met, only engaging in central processing 
when their expectations are violated. This is also 
demonstrated this in the context of Google search 
suggestions; where users felt the cost of processing 
explanations outweighed their benefits [12]. Transparency 
needs to be operationalized in ways that allow users to 
understand transparency through both cursory heuristic 
routes and also through focused effort. 
Emotional Analytics 
Our focus is on how users interact with an intelligent 
personal informatics systems which are being increasingly 
deployed within commercial [83–85] and research domains 
[7,25,35,52,52,82]. These systems track how a person 
operates on some dimension, whether physical, emotional, 
or mental, and then suggest improvements to this behavior 
through customized feedback and recommendations  
[35,66]. Such data potentially allows users to analyze and 
modify their behaviors to promote well-being [15,16,37].  
Emotional analytics is a fruitful domain for transparency 
research for many reasons. In contrast to other work that 
presents hypothetical scenarios in which participants read 
about or watch algorithmic deployments and decisions 
[26,47], our aim was to have users experience the algorithm 
in situ, as it directly made decisions about their own data 
[39]. One important characteristic of emotional 
interpretation is that users are knowledgeable about the 
status of their own feelings and experiences, allowing them 
to directly compare algorithmic interpretations with their 
own personal evaluations of their emotional experiences. 
This contrasts with other applications of smart algorithms, 
such as medical diagnoses. In these complex realms regular 
users might be less able to interpret the results of 
algorithmic interpretations. In addition, emotion is highly 
variable between individuals and previous research 
demonstrates difficulty in accurately predicting emotion 
from text [45,67]. This allows us to closely examine how 
users understand a system under varying degrees of error. 
RESEARCH SYSTEM: E-METER 
We wanted to test users’ reactions to a transparent system 
that actively interpreted their own data. We developed a 
working system called the E-meter that uses textual entries 
to predict emotion. The E-meter (Figs 1,2) presents users 
with a web page showing a system depiction, a short 
description of the system, instructions, and a text box to 
write in. The system was described as an “algorithm that 
assesses the positivity/negativity of [their] writing”.  
The algorithm underlying emotion detection worked in the 
following way: each word that was written by the user was 
checked for its positive/negative emotion association in our 
model. If it was found in the model, the overall mood rating 
in the system was updated. This constitutes an incremental 
linear regression that recalculates each time a word is 
written.  
Machine Learning Model 
As we outlined above, current processes for explanation of 
inscrutable models such as deep neural networks involve 
approximating the inscrutable model by a simpler, often 
linear, model [79]. Therefore, we focus on a linear model so 
that our transparency can be operationalized in a way that is 
faithful to current research. While this model may be less 
accurate than those involving other methods, it nevertheless 
gave us presentational control. It allowed us to directly 
visualize important elements for users that explained the 
algorithm’s underlying operation.  
Emotion predictions for users’ experiences were generated 
using a linear regression model trained on text from the 
EmotiCal project [35,75]. In EmotiCal, users wrote short 
textual entries about daily experiences and directly 
evaluated their mood in relation to those experiences. This 
data gave us a gold-standard supervised training set on 
which to train our linear regression. We trained the linear 
regression on 6249 textual entries and mood scores from 
164 EmotiCal users. Text features were stemmed using the 
Porter stemming algorithm [65]and then the top 600 
unigrams were selected by F-score, i.e. we selected the 600 
words that were most strongly predictive of user emotion 
ratings. Using a train/test split of 85/15 the linear regression 
tested at R2= 0.25; mean absolute error was .95 on the 
target variable (mood) scale of (-3,3). In order to implement 
this model on a larger range for the E-meter, we scaled the 
predictions to (0,100) to create a more continuous and 
variable experience for users. The mean absolute error of 
our model indicates that the E-meter will, on average, err by 
15.83 points on a (0,100) scale for each user’s mood 
prediction. 
Document-level version: As users wrote, the E-meter 
showed the system’s global interpretation of the emotion of 
their writing. If the overall text was interpreted as positive, 
the meter filled the gauge to the right and turned more 
green (Fig 2); if the text was interpreted negatively, the 
gauge was emptied to the left and turned more red (Fig 1). 
This continuous scale feedback represents the coarse and 
global information that many machine learning systems 
currently display. These systems give an overall rating but 
don’t allow the user insight into the detailed workings of 
the algorithm. 
Word-level version: In contrast to the document-level 
version, the word-level condition provided fine-grained 
transparency. We operationalized such transparency by 
highlighting the mood association of each word in the 
model; if a word is highly associated with positive mood 
Figure 2: E-meter Word-Level Feedback Condition 
 
Figure 1: E-meter Document-Level Feedback Condition 
 
then it will be highlighted green, a word associated with 
negative mood will be highlighted orange or red. The word-
level version showed immediate incremental feedback 
about how the system interprets each word they type. In this 
version, individual words are highlighted and color coded 
according to how the underlying algorithm interpreted that 
word’s affect. This incremental feedback allows users to 
see how each individual word they write contributes to the 
overall E-meter rating. Furthermore, words remain 
highlighted as users continue to type allowing them to 
assess each word’s relative contribution to the overall score.  
This form of transparency offers users insight into the 
underlying word-based regression model driving the E-
meter visualization; it depicts how the regression model 
correlates each word with positive or negative emotion to 
arrive at an overall weighting for the entire text that the user 
has entered. The fact that the visualization is persistent also 
allows users to reexamine what they have written, 
reconciling the overall E-meter rating with the fine-grained 
word-level connotations. 
We could have operationalized transparency in other ways. 
Other researchers have operationalized transparency 
through natural language explanations [40] and diagrams 
[47]. However, in our case we can convey key aspects of 
the underlying system through word highlighting. In 
addition, our operationalization allows the answering of 
counterfactual questions, an important part of explanation 
[54,79]. Highlighting the text helps directly convey to the 
user what drives the algorithm and gives clear clues about 
the underlying linear model. In addition, by varying the 
colors of the highlighting we also show how the model is 
interpreting the specific words. 
STUDY 1 
Method 
Participants experienced both versions of the E-meter 
system and after using each version they were asked a 
series of follow-up questions. The study design was 
counterbalanced; half the users experienced the document-
level system version first. 
Users 
We recruited 100 users to test the E-meter system who had 
previously passed a short mental health screening (PGWBI) 
[30]. Users were recruited from Amazon Turk and paid 
$3.33. The evaluation took 14.68 minutes on average. This 
study was approved by an Institutional Review Board. 
Following prior methodological recommendations in [18] 
we eliminated 26 respondents based on their responses to 
open ended questions, leaving us with a sample of 74 users.  
Measures 
Before actually using the system, participants saw 
simulations of both versions of the system and were asked 
to predict accuracy for each. The first survey question was 
preceded by animations simulating both versions of the 
system as filler Latin text was typed. We used Latin text 
because we wanted high-level system comparisons from 
users. If we had shown an animation of typed English, the 
users could have made their assessments based on reactions 
to specific words. Following the animations we asked the 
predicted accuracy question “This program evaluates the 
positivity/negativity of emotional experiences that users 
write about. How accurate or inaccurate do you think this 
program would be for you? The program works with 
English also.” Users then provided qualitative explanations 
for their ratings—“Please give 2 or more reasons for the 
accuracy ratings you made on the previous page.” After this 
they began the writing activity: Users were presented one of 
the two system version along with the instructions “Please 
write at least 100 words about an emotional experience that 
affected you in the last week.” Following system 
experience, users completed the TLX workload assessment 
[33]. Users then answered the questions: “How positive or 
negative did you feel your writing was?” (subjective affect), 
“How positive or negative did the E-meter assess your 
writing to be?” (system affect), “How accurate or inaccurate 
was the E-meter in its assessment of your writing?” 
(retrospective accuracy), “How trustworthy or 
untrustworthy did you find the E-meter system?” 
(subjective trust). 
Users then repeated this process for the other system 
version. After using both versions, users answered a final 
experience-based system preference question “If you were 
to use the E-meter again, which system would you prefer?”. 
They then supplied reasons for this: “Please give 2 or more 
reasons for the choice you made above”. Questions and 
procedure were carefully piloted and had been used before 
in multiple prior studies.  
Results 
Overall, the median user found the E-meter to be ‘Slightly 
Accurate’ and ‘Slightly Trustworthy’, both distributions 
were bimodal and there was no difference in conditions (p = 
.24, p=.41). 
Word-level transparency is predicted to be more accurate 
before usage: Before any hands-on experience with the 
system, participants generated predicted accuracy 
judgments for both word-level and document-level 
transparency. We statistically compared the difference in 
these system evaluations using a paired t test. Participants 
anticipated greater accuracy for the word-level system, 
t(73)=5.452, p=0.022, although the effect was small and 
means were 4.24 and 4.57 respectively. Qualitative user 
comments supported these anticipated benefits. On being 
asked to explain why they had word-level transparency to 
be more accurate, users drew attention to the benefits of 
incremental low-level color-coded feedback giving a clearer 
sense of how the system was operating, and boosting their 
confidence that the system was operating appropriately. 
Participant 73 wrote “The second one had a legend with it 
and actually changed the color of the words I would have 
written. … It was also more catchy and the colors stood out 
to me.” In the same vein, participant 50 wrote: “One meter 
is more transparent than the other. I can see how it works. I 
feel more confident in knowing exactly how it comes up 
with its answers. I tend to think it is more reliable.” Overall 
then, before actually using either transparency version, 
users anticipated that a system offering word-level 
transparency would be more accurate.  
Recall that after experiencing each system version, we 
asked users for retrospective accuracy, and a final 
experience-based preference about which system version 
they would choose for future usage. User perceptions of 
retrospective accuracy with both versions of the system 
highly correlate with their final experience-based system 
preference in a logistic regression model (p’s = [0.019, 
0.0001]). Given only accuracy scores from both versions, 
we can predict the version choice with 69.5% accuracy in a 
5-fold cross-validated test. Therefore, knowing users’ 
predictive accuracy was higher for the word-level version, 
we would expect that this would lead to users ultimately 
preferring the more transparent word-level version of the 
system. 
After experiencing the system there is no preference for 
either system version. However, this positive evaluation of 
word-level accuracy did not persist after actual experience 
with the system, when we analyzed final experience-based 
preferences. As we expected, many of those who preferred 
the word-level highlighting did so because it illustrated the 
inner workings of the system. Participant 72 said “I know 
what the first [word-level] version is doing. I cannot tell 
what the second version [document-level] is doing. Because 
the second version does not give real feedback, I cannot 
make an informed decision when writing if I should be 
using it or not.” Participant 28 concurred, saying “I think it 
[the word-level version] provides more engaging feedback 
and helps me better understand the reasons it gives for the 
amount in the meter.”  
However, to our surprise, after experience with both 
systems overall users were evenly split in which version of 
the system they preferred to use in the future: Fifty percent 
of participants (37) said that they would prefer the 
document-level version if they were to use the system 
again. The other 50% (37) chose the word-level condition. 
Consistent with these preference judgments, participants 
also showed no overall differences in trust after using the 
two different system versions (t(73)=.910, p=.343). 
versions. While users seemed to have better impressions of 
the word-level condition initially, those preferences 
disappear after using both systems. It is important to note in 
this context that although the only differences between the 
systems lay in their transparency, users seemed to treat 
them as operating quite differently. As we will see later, 
even though participants knew both versions of the system 
existed at the start of the experiment, they were prone to 
attribute different qualities to each after experiencing them. 
Overall, both the final system choice and trust showed no 
differences between system versions despite people being 
confident initially that the Word version would be more 
accurate. What could explain these changed perceptions 
after usage? 
Role of Cognitive Load: One possible explanation for this 
changed perception is cognitive load. Incremental word-
level feedback may demand attention and distract 
participants, in contrast to the document-level system 
version which does not present as much information. Some 
participants’ explanations for their experience-based 
preference seem to support this. These participants (n=13) 
cited the distracting nature of the word-level highlighting as 
a motivation for preferring document level transparency. 
Users called word-level feedback “annoying” (P3) and 
“obtrusive” (P7). Participant 20 said that the document-
level was “a lot less distracting”. P57 said “The individual 
highlighting of the words was distracting during writing; I 
wouldn't have minded it as much if I could turn it on and 
off.” However, these subjective reports were not borne out 
by our quantitative analysis of cognitive load as assessed by 
the TLX survey. A paired t-test comparing the overall TLX 
measures for both versions of the system indicated no 
difference in workload: t(73) = -.05, p=.95.   
Reduced transparency may lead users to overestimate 
system capabilities:  Another potential reason why users 
may prefer document-level feedback relates to user 
inferences about algorithmic capability. Our qualitative 
analysis of experience-based preference suggests that when 
users know less about the working of the system, they seem 
to ascribe more advanced abilities to it. Nearly a quarter 
(24%) of users who chose document-level transparency as 
their preferred version stated that they preferred it because 
it took their overall writing context into account, 
incorporating information beyond simple lexical 
weightings. Participant 66 said, “I think the second 
[document-level version] one takes into account everything 
you are writing and makes a decision better than just by 
focusing on word choice.” Participant 17 concurred, saying 
“I like the second [document-level version] as it seems to 
focus on the whole and not each word.” While these 
document-level inferences are positive, they are also 
inaccurate. Recall that both systems use the same 
underlying machine learning model which uses solely 
individual word features.  
Contributing to this overestimation of system capabilities 
may be the fact that document-level feedback hides low-
level errors from users. In contrast, many word-level users 
commented on highlighted words they felt were 
misclassified, leading them to downgrade their system 
evaluation. For example, participant 40 chose the 
document-level version, justifying it by saying: “...the 
biggest reason is that the most negative thought I had was 
expressed by the word "isolated" in the text I wrote and the 
e-meter marked that one word as "Unimportant"  I couldn't 
get past that.” Participant 70 said: “Some associations don't 
make any sense, while others do.” In contrast, document-
level feedback did not expose these errors. If the algorithm 
was behaving consistently with their overall expectations, 
users in the document-level condition judged it very 
positively. 
Together these observations suggest that error hiding and 
the absence of detailed information in document-level 
feedback leads some participants to form approximate but 
positive working heuristics about how the system operates. 
Discussion 
Our initial hypothesis was that providing detailed, 
incremental word-level feedback would be more helpful to 
users than general document-level information. However, 
our first study unearthed some unexpected findings, 
showing that user interpretations of transparency feedback 
are far from straightforward. Consistent with our initial 
expectations and the prior literature on transparency, 
[26,46], users anticipated a preference for word-level 
feedback before using the system. Users justified this 
preference by making arguments that such feedback would 
provide detailed incremental information about algorithmic 
decisions. But to our surprise, many participants did not 
retain this preference after using the system, at which point 
participants were evenly split between the systems in their 
trust and transparency preferences. As we had originally 
anticipated, some users continued to prefer the word-level 
version because of the greater transparency it provided, and 
they were likely to cite the increased insight that it 
facilitated into the algorithm’s underlying operation. In 
contrast, others preferred document level feedback, but 
offered very different reasons for their preferences. Many 
of these users chose the document-level feedback because 
they seemed to find highlighting to be distracting, although 
our cognitive load results do not support this. Others may 
have preferred document-level feedback because it did not 
expose word-level errors, potentially leading users to 
overestimate the competence of the underlying algorithm 
with the consequence that they believed it to be more 
advanced than it was. For these users who preferred the 
document-level version, it seemed that incremental 
feedback was providing more information than they 
required [12,40]. 
STUDY 2 
Ideally a system should mitigate the negative distracting 
elements of incremental transparency while providing 
improved understanding to users. However, it is difficult 
from our initial study to know how to operationalize 
transparency in a way that achieves this. In order to better 
understand how to convey transparency to users in effective 
ways we employed a semi-structured interviewing process 
in our second study.  
We also used think-aloud interviewing methods to examine 
in depth how the type and timing of algorithmic 
transparency can inform decisions about how to design 
effective transparency. In particular, given that Study 1 
indicated that some users felt incremental feedback 
provided too much information, Study 2 examines letting 
users view increased transparency only when they explicitly 
request it, after they have finished writing. Overall Study 2 
gathered richer contextual qualitative data to illuminate 
what factors influence the interpretation and uptake of 
transparency information. In particular we wanted to better 
understand why ostensibly richer feedback was not 
providing anticipated benefits to some participants. 
Method 
Users 
Twelve users were recruited from an internal participant 
pool at a large United States west-coast university. They 
received course credit for participation. Participants average 
age was 19.54 years (sd=1.52) and 7/12 identified as 
female. This study was approved by an Institutional Review 
Board. 
Measures 
Users completed a shortened version of the PGWBI to 
screen for mental health before participants began the study 
[30]. Users answered a similar set of survey questions to 
Study 1 in a think-aloud style; however, these were 
primarily used to prompt explanation and structure the 
interview. As such, we do not present the results in this 
paper. 
Procedure 
The participants were randomly divided into one of two 
conditions. Both groups were given document-level 
affective feedback from the E-meter (Fig 1). 
Condition 1: Six participants received real-time incremental 
word-level feedback about the algorithm’s interpretation of 
their affect as they typed each word.  
Condition 2: The other six only obtained word-level 
feedback after they had finished the writing task; these 
users explicitly requested word-level feedback by clicking a 
button labeled “How was this rating calculated?”.  
The researcher explained the experiment and think-aloud 
procedure, demonstrating a think-aloud on an email client. 
The researcher asked participants to “Please write at least 
100 words about an emotional experience that affected you 
in the last week.” After the think-aloud writing exercise, the 
experimenter conducted a semi-structured interview that 
included an on-screen survey. After the survey, participants 
in the initial document-level condition 1 saw exactly the 
same screen with an added button labeled “How was this 
rating calculated” which they pressed to reveal word-level 
highlighting. The entire process took around 50 minutes.  
Analysis 
Interviews were recorded using both audio and screen-
recording. Two interviews (one from each condition) were 
not audio recorded, thus only the remaining 10 are used for 
the analysis. For this qualitative analysis, responses were 
coded using thematic analysis [11] specifically targeting 
RQ3: What problems must be mitigated to support effective 
transparency? 
Results 
More Transparency is Not Always Better:  The word-level 
version of the E-meter again operationalized transparency 
using color highlighting to show how each word contributes 
to the calculation of the overall mood score. However, 
several users took issue with this level of detail. P10 felt 
that only the “big emotionally heavy words” should be 
highlighted. Other users felt similarly, P4 talked about 
select “trigger” words that that “trigger the foundation of 
the issue” and were essential to understanding the text. P8 
felt that there were a few important words and the rest just 
added noise: “its taking into account words like ‘stressful’ 
and ‘regretful’ and stuff but then like everything else in 
between adds like an extra layer that complicates it”. While 
the machine learning model was limited to the 600 most 
predictive words of mood, that model still seemed to 
present too many extraneous words that users felt were 
unimportant. From a design perspective, it may be that 
users need to identify a small number of clear examples of 
words showing strongly positive and negative affect, in 
order to form a working model of system operation.  
Transparency May Violate User Expectations Even When 
the System is Correct: Similar to how participants felt there 
were many extraneous highlighted words, participants also 
often focused on specific words that they judged had been 
misinterpreted by the system. Many users wrote about their 
experiences in the first person, often using the word “I”. In 
our machine learning model, “I” has a slightly negative 
connotation which confused our users, because many of 
them thought “I” should be neutral. P8 said “So I was 
gonna say that yellow words would be neutral because it 
has highlighted ‘I’...”. Along the same lines, when 
analyzing the highlighting of different words, P6 said “‘I’? 
Mmm, I don’t understand that either”. Participant 5 even 
started conjecturing about the actual system model saying 
“‘I’ doesn’t seem like it would have…[participant trails off] 
unless people speak in objective terms when they’re talking 
about more positive experiences.” Clearly these users don’t 
feel that the word “I” has negative connotations. However, 
extant literature confirms that system feedback is correct as 
usage of first person singular pronouns are correlated with 
depression and negative mood [63,70]. These examples 
indicate a problem when system feedback reveals 
information that contradicts the users’ expectations. Even if 
the system is objectively correct when displaying 
transparency information, it can still cause users to take 
issue and result in poorer perceptions of that system. 
User Heuristics Interact Negatively with Transparency: 
Other problems arose because users formed working 
heuristics of how the system operated, which were 
sometimes contradicted by word-level feedback. Four of the 
12 users felt that there were discrepancies between 
document-level and word-level feedback within the system. 
When Participant 8 viewed the word-level transparency 
they started off by saying “I’m very confused” and then 
explained how they felt the overall rating should just be 
calculated as a ratio of positive/negative words—“Well I 
just assumed that some words would be coded as positive or 
negative and then it would just like do a ratio of those two.” 
Participant 6 explained it similarly, the document-level 
rating showed a slightly negative emotion rating for their 
written passage but, in participant 6’s words: “So when you 
look at the comparison with the meter, and you look at my 
paragraph itself, right? There’s more words that are 
highlighted in green.” These users are using simple 
heuristics to relate the document-level and word-level 
transparency. They feel that the document-level rating 
should reflect a simple ratio of the word-level transparency. 
For example, if the highlighted words are primarily green, 
then the overall rating should be very positive. However, in 
our machine learning model, a single word such as “angry” 
could be rated negatively enough that it would cancel out 
multiple mildly positive words. Some users arrive at this 
correct model after consciously engaging with the system. 
For example, recall how participant 6 talked about how they 
felt the word-level highlighting and document-level 
transparency were incongruent; however, after thinking 
more deeply, this participant later said: “... it’s weighing 
certain words, right? Because obviously these two words, 
right? Like “upset” and like—er yeah, “upset” really 
polarize the meter.” This quote demonstrates that this user 
has moved beyond their initial heuristic that all words are 
weighted equally; they are now noting how one word 
seemed to have a larger effect in the system.  
Together these observations suggest that users initially form 
simple working hypotheses about system operation. Users 
seem to engage with transparency first by operating with 
these simple hypotheses and only scrutinizing these when 
their expectations aren’t met. As with other areas of 
reasoning, it may be that in interacting with a system users 
first engage in rapid, approximate, System 1 thinking and 
only engage in deeper, more analytic, System 2 thinking 
when truly prompted or confronted with clearly anomalous 
information [38,64]. 
Discussion 
The second study again revealed the complexity involved in 
presenting transparency information. Confirming our first 
study, we again showed that providing more detailed 
transparency information isn’t always better. While some 
users saw potential benefits to word level information, they 
argued against “complete” transparency, preferring to see 
only a subset of ‘important’ words. This observation 
suggests a principle for transparency presentation that limits 
the amount of information presented. This principle might 
involve explaining as much variation as possible using the 
smallest number of explanatory features. We might 
therefore aim to weigh the overall number of features we 
present against the information they provide. This is 
consistent with machine learning approaches to developing 
models with high dimensional feature sets, that aim to 
identify features with the greatest explanatory power. While 
we have seen technical methods that support this [53], we 
have not seen such transparency actually tested with users. 
A second observation is that users may take issue with 
detailed transparency and predictions, even when 
underlying system models are objectively correct. This 
creates quite a difficult problem for system designers. If it 
were possible to know which features users prompt 
mistaken beliefs, then these features could be excluded 
from transparency. Unfortunately, short of testing user 
beliefs about all features, this may be very hard to do. We 
also saw that users don’t actively interrogate transparency 
information to deeply analyze all its implications. Instead, 
users often look for quick heuristic routes to confirm or 
discredit simple working theories. We should therefore 
design intelligent systems in ways that allow users to 
develop simple working heuristics but also invite them to 
evolve more accurate mental models when they are 
motivated to do so. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Unlike much technically oriented work that aims to develop 
new transparency algorithms, we explored user-centric 
perceptions, and reactions to, transparency. Both studies 
indicate that developing and deploying transparent smart 
systems is complex in practice, when we have users engage 
with real systems that interpret their personal data. In both 
studies, we found unexpected user reactions to our attempts 
to provide detailed information about algorithmic operation. 
In Study 1 we found that before actual usage, participants 
initially anticipate greater accuracy for the word-level 
transparency version of the E-meter but this is altered by 
their system experiences. After using both systems, they are 
split 50-50 in their preference, and trust data showed similar 
ambivalence. We identified several possible reasons for this 
shift. As anticipated, participants who preferred the word-
level version valued the increased system understanding 
that transparency afforded. But two different reasons led to 
users preferring the document-level version: users attributed 
more sophisticated abilities to the less transparent system 
and felt distracted by increased transparency. Although 
many user comments mentioned how incremental word 
level affective feedback was highly distracting, these 
comments were not reflected by a reliable overall difference 
in cognitive load between transparency conditions as 
assessed by NASA TLX. However more sensitive online 
measures of cognitive load might yield different results.  
These initial results raise the question of how we can 
operationalize transparency in ways that don’t distract, 
while simultaneously allowing users to engage with the 
system using simple heuristics and facilitating advanced 
understanding. Study 2 gathered richer contextual data to 
illuminate exactly how to operationalize transparency to fit 
the goals from Study 1. To address distraction and improve 
clarity, we discovered that some users prefer to see only 
major contributing features to the document-level rating. 
More detailed transparency information can lead some 
users to falsely believe the system is operating incorrectly. 
Furthermore, users often evaluate transparency using 
simple heuristics rather than deep reflection. Together these 
results indicate that supporting transparency is complex and 
there are myriad decisions that affect the user experience 
when deciding how to operationalize it. We now suggest 
design approaches that build on these observations. 
Meeting the Competing Needs of Transparency Through 
Progressive Disclosure 
Studies 1 and 2 unearthed requirements that transparency 
must meet to be effective for users. This is a challenge 
because some of these requirements seem internally 
inconsistent. How can we allow users to develop system 
heuristics while at the same time facilitating detailed 
understanding for those users who value it? One design 
solution is suggested by an interaction that took place in 
Study 2. Recall that some users wrote their experience 
using the document-level version and only later saw the 
word-level transparency after clicking a button labeled 
“How was this rating generated?” After clicking the button 
to reveal word-level highlighting, Participant 11 had further 
questions. Quite naturally, the participant pointed at the 
button again and had this exchange with the researcher: 
P11: Can I click this? Does this...? 
I: I don’t think it shows any more than that. 
P11: Damn it. 
I: Yeah. If you were to click it, what would you 
expect to see more about? 
P11: I want bullet points to tell me why it works 
the way it does.  
Even after seeing the exhaustive word-level feature 
contributions to the document-level rating, this user still 
had more questions about the system’s inner workings. This 
data point suggests an interaction paradigm that meets the 
competing needs these two studies have generated: 
progressive disclosure. 
Progressive disclosure has a long history in UI research, 
dating back to the Xerox Star and early word processing 
systems [14,59,72]. The original concept involved hiding 
advanced interface controls; allowing users to make fewer 
initial errors and learn the system more effectively [14]. In 
other words, advanced information and explanation is 
provided on an ‘as needed’ basis but only when the user 
requests it. Progressive disclosure is also consistent with 
literature on explanation from the social sciences, which 
argues that in human-human interaction, explanations are 
‘occasioned’, being provided only when the situation 
demands it [27,29,34,71]. We can apply the principles of 
progressive disclosure directly to transparency in intelligent 
systems. For example, similar to Study 2, the E-meter could 
show a “How was this rating calculated?” button. In this 
setting, the E-meter might start with only a document-level 
rating, which reduces distraction and avoids unnecessary 
complexity. Upon first press of the button, the E-meter 
shows a brief natural language explanation e.g. “This rating 
was calculated using the positive and negative weighting of 
the words you have written.” On the next press, the E-meter 
shows a limited set of the high confidence and highly 
contributing words. This second press satisfies the users in 
Study 2 who only wanted to see the major factors. 
However, some users (like those in Study 1) may want yet 
more transparency. Another press of the button could reveal 
further features that contributed to the overall score. More 
presses could reveal details about how the data was 
collected or a textual summary of the machine learning 
model. In this progressive disclosure approach, explanation 
is presented as two-way communication with the user 
driving exactly when and how explanations are provided. 
Note too that because transparency is provided ‘on demand’ 
this removes confusions and inefficiencies arising from 
spurious, unwanted explanations, and adjusts explanations 
to the users’ requirements. These design suggestions are 
consistent with recent work on folk theories in algorithmic 
systems [19,22] as well as a large body of social science 
theory; these theories show that people are content to 
operate with simple (often inaccurate) situational heuristics 
unless they are deeply invested in a decision or the situation 
is strikingly anomalous [38,64]. 
Progressive disclosure of transparency is not limited to 
predictions from text. For example, other researchers have 
examined transparency in the context of deep learning 
models predicting patient outcomes in the medical realm 
[43]. In this context, patients have a predicted diagnosis risk 
of a disease and a high number of features (e.g. previous 
medical diagnoses, number of doctor visits, type of care). 
Each feature can be visualized and ranked for its 
contribution to the overall predicted diagnosis risk score. In 
addition, users can compare outcomes between patients and 
conduct what-if analyses by modifying patient attributes 
and seeing how predicted risk changes. Our results suggest 
that exposing all this at once could overwhelm certain 
users, leading them to reject the tool. To operationalize 
progressive disclosure in this setting, we could present the 
predicted risk score by default with a short natural language 
explanation. Should the user request more information, we 
can incorporate visualizations of features that most 
contribute to the predicted risk score. A request for further 
information could show similar patients and previous 
outcomes that have informed the current prediction. Finally, 
as the user continues requesting increasing amounts of 
disclosure about a prediction, we know the user is invested 
enough to truly engage with the system and we can present 
an interactive what-if tool. This tool allows users to modify 
a patient’s features and see how it changes the risk 
prediction, helping the user to consciously build an accurate 
mental model of the machine learning predictions. Again, 
the major contribution of progressive disclosure is avoiding 
overwhelming users with information, but instead slowly 
increasing transparency as they indicate a willingness to 
engage meaningfully with it. We believe this can improve 
the acceptance of intelligent systems in many realms. 
Impact for Future Transparency Research 
Another issue arising from our research is the role of 
individual differences. It was apparent that different users 
have varying reactions to, and expectations about intelligent 
systems. One possibility is that these differences arise from 
individual user traits, such as need for control [2] or need 
for cognition [13]. Future work might examine the relation 
between such individual traits and reactions to 
transparency, allowing designers to profile users and 
deploying personalized system versions.  
Our results also have important methodological 
implications. One method used in prior studies is to provide 
potential system users with hypothetical scenarios 
describing system operation and eliciting reactions to those 
systems. These methods offer ways to collect controlled 
user data at scale [26,47]. However, results from Study 1 
indicate the importance of direct user experience when 
making system evaluations; users’ perceptions of the 
system were very different following actual usage 
compared with their projected reactions prior to usage. Care 
needs to be taken with usage of scenario-based methods.  
Limitations  
The current study examines the algorithmic domain of 
emotion regulation and clearly other contexts need to be 
explored. Furthermore, our deployment of a working 
algorithm meant that results were obtained for situations 
where our algorithm generated a moderate numbers of 
errors—future research should evaluate contexts where 
there are different levels of errors. Additionally, while users 
generated their own data in our system, results were not 
directly used to inform other aspects of the user’s personal 
behavior so the costs of system errors were low. While this 
is appropriate for exploring understanding of initial 
algorithms with moderate error rates, future work might 
explore user reactions to transparency in more high stakes 
contexts. While we believe our implications regarding 
progressive disclosure are generalizable, our work derived 
these insights from one operationalization of transparency, 
namely a dynamic visualization of the algorithm. There are 
many other ways to depict how an algorithm operates 
including verbal explanations, concrete user exploration, 
and so forth [40,42,48,69].  
Conclusion 
Overall, our data suggest empirically motivated challenges 
in designing effective UX methods to support transparency 
for complex algorithms. Our results also unveil potential 
new research questions regarding user traits, system 
heuristics and workload. The current study indicates a 
promising design approach involving progressive disclosure 
which we intend to explore in future work. It is critical to 
answer these questions as we continue to deploy intelligent 
systems with increasing ubiquity and impact.  
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